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The Reliance Interest in Trade Law
Daniel A. Farber*
Much has been said, and will continue to be said, about
what a terrific person Bob Hudec was and also about his deservedly great influence on trade law. All of that is true. I would be
happy to make a few additions to the stock of anecdotes illustrating the humor, insight, and modesty of this eminent scholar.
But I can vividly imagine his response: "Yes, that's all very nice,
but a little discussion of my actual ideas might be nice, too." In
this brief tribute, I want to say something about one of his key
ideas about trade law-an idea that he stressed in conversation,
but that does not seem to have received the attention it deserves. However, I do not want to neglect his human qualities
and scholarly impact, and will try to say something about those
things along the way too.
I will take an indirect approach to the point about trade
law, and my starting point is an article that Bob wrote two decades ago about contract law. 1 (Please be patient: I will make the
connection with trade law shortly.) That article was, in turn,
largely a commentary about one of the great classics of contract
scholarship, Fuller and Perdue's The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages.2 Essentially, Fuller and Perdue had argued for
a shift in the usual way of thinking about contract damages.
Rather than seeking to put the plaintiff in the same position as
if the contract had been performed, this measure of damages
would put the plaintiff in the same position as if the contract
had never been made in the first place. Fuller and Perdue's
work strongly influenced the drafting of the Second Restatement
of Contracts. In his own article, Bob carefully traced this influence and then patiently disentangled the various meanings of
* Sho Sato Professor of Law, University of California at Berkeley.

1. Robert E. Hudec, Restating the "RelianceInterest, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 704
(1982).
2. L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages I, 46 YALE L.J. 52 (1936); L. L. Fuller & William R. Perdue Jr., The Reliance Interest in ContractDamages II, 46 YALE L.J. 373 (1936).

MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE

[Vol. 13:2

"reliance," their incorporation into the Restatement, and their
connection with doctrinal issues.
A reader who knew only Bob's work in trade law would find
many familiar characteristics in his contracts article: analytic
precision and clarity, sensitivity to political and social context,
thorough research, and awareness of policy implications. It was
those traits that helped make his trade scholarship so influential-and indeed, have led one of my current colleagues to speak
of the "Hudec Effect," which is a degree of respect that makes
that scholarship almost too authoritative to question. (Or in
other words, scholarship that is worthy of reliance, and on
which people do unquestioningly rely.) But it may seem more
surprising that those traits were exhibited in a work about the
3
seemingly arid subject of contract damages.
Rather than taking up space here with the details of the article, let me use a few sample quotations to give a sense of his
intellectual style:
[T]he recognition of these other types of liability shows that there is
not necessarily a single measure of reliance liability. The measure of
recovery will necessarily depend on the discrete value
judgments un4
derlying the particular concept of liability at issue.
Still, the black-letter definitions themselves leave considerable room
for interpretation, and that is not necessarily undesirable. The border
5
line is vague, and case-by-case resolution appropriate.
The difficulty with the essential/incidental distinction arises primarily
6
because two distinctions, rather than one, lurk in this terminology.
The reason for the court's divided treatment seems obvious. The
transaction took place near the end of World War II .... Even if the
machines had arrived on time, it was quite doubtful that the buyer
would have commenced
operations, or if it had, that it would have
7
earned any money.
Distinctions between various types of reliance claims tend to be obscured by our preoccupation with the larger reliance-expectancy distinction .... We need to be reminded that important differences in the
degrees of ethical urgency exist within the category of reliance claims
as well. These differences are quite likely to influence decisions, appearing in one form or another as a grudging attitude toward some

3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Offended contracts scholars should note that I said "seemingly" arid.
Hudec, supra note 2, at 717.
Id. at 721.
Id. at 724.
Id. at 730.
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consequential-reliance claims.

8

It may seem admirable that Bob was able to bring his customary acumen to bear on a topic as dusty as contract damages,
but one might still wonder why he bothered. Why should the
same person find contract damages and trade law to be compelling subjects?
The answer, I think-and this finally gets to the connection
I promised earlier-is that he saw them as, in some sense, the
same subject. In his patient efforts to tutor me in the rudiments
of trade law-simply one example of his frequent generosity as a
colleague and mentor-he was at pains to remind me that the
GATT (later the WTO) was a deal, a contract, not an enactment
by a legislature. He made the same point in one of his later
writings. If I may impose on you with another quotation, this
time a lengthier one:
The central "wrong" that triggers legal remedies in the WTO legal system is a concept known as "nullification and impairment," which refers
to a failure by a government to receive some part of the market access
it was promised as a quid pro quo for the market access that it has
granted to other governments .... If the defendant government does
not (or cannot) remove the offending measure, then the defendant government must either grant new trade concessions in compensation-a
substitute quid pro quo that will restore the balance of the original
deal--or must suffer a proportionate increase of trade barriers by the
other government or governments injured by the measure-a "moneyback" type of remedy that also restores the balance of the deal, in a
downward direction ....
Nonviolation nullification and impairment is a less binding form of
remedy along the same lines. Under the NVN&I concept, a measure
not in violation of any promise, and thus not a legal violation, can nevertheless be found to be "impairing" the market-access benefits that a
country could reasonably have anticipated from the promises made in
a trade agreement ....
[T]he government injured by this unanticipated measure is still entitled to rebalance the deal--either by receiving equivalent trade concessions from the offending country, or by tak9
ing its money back in the form of trade retaliation.

What the article calls a "money-back" remedy here is of
course a form of reliance damages, 10 putting the complaining
country in the same position that it would have been if that part
of the deal had never been made. The article goes on to suggest

8. Id. at 733.
9. Robert E. Hudec, A WTO Perspective on PrivateAnti-Competitive Behavior
in World Markets, 34 N. ENG. L. REV. 79, 89-90 (1999).
10. It could also be viewed as a restitutionary remedy.
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that such reliance damages might be used to solve a new problem: how to remedy a country's fostering of anticompetitive
practices by its industries. Thus, Fuller and Perdue's reliance
interest may have a role to play in the future evolution of trade
law!
Bob's suggestion of a reliance remedy is creative and may
well turn out to be fruitful. But the larger point is the more important one. It is tempting for lawyers to think of GATT (and
even more so, WTO rules) as the equivalent of domestic law-to
speak, for example, of GATT as a constitution for world trade.
Such analogies may be enlightening. From an economist's point
of view, trade rules may be all gain and no pain (as I sometimes
reminded Bob in our conversations, with all the confidence of
the neophyte who is studying hard to become a novice). But
that is hardly true as a political matter, as he was quick to remind me. Countries enter into trade agreements because they
are willing to accept provisions they do not like in return for
provisions they do like-in other words, because there is a bargain. Forgetting the contractual nature of trade law risks a degree of confusion.
More generally yet, the contracts article aptly illustrates
the strengths of Bob's scholarship. It is not easy to find such insistence on intellectual precision, combined with such wellseasoned realism and balanced judgment. In one of his last publications-a gemlike introduction to trade law in ten pages-Bob
announced what might have stood as his scholarly motto, when
he remarked that "clarity for its own sake is always good.""1
That quest for clarity was a characteristic of all his scholarship,
including (as we saw earlier) the article on reliance damages.
But intellectual clarity did not come at the expense of a willingness to pass judgment. In the same article, Bob also took the
occasion to denounce some WTO provisions for giving foreign
traders "a greater set of legal rights than is given to the domestic producers with whom they compete." 12 Embedded throughout the article are the lessons of his own experiences as a member of trade tribunals, 13 including a rueful awareness that
''governments make deliberately protectionist decisions all the
time. "14
11.

Robert E. Hudec, Science and "Post-Discriminatory"WTO Law, 26 B.C.

INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 185, 189 (2003).

12.
13.
14.

Id. at 188.
Id. at 186.
Id. at 192.
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This combination of intellectual clarity, political and economic realism, and moral integrity was the hallmark of his
scholarship-whether the subject was international trade or the
more mundane issue of contract damages. Those of us who
knew Bob will miss him as a friend and colleague. The world
will miss him as a scholar. On that, you can rely.
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